Lawyer's Duties to the Client



Regala v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996
Kapunan, J.

FACTS:

As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners admit that they assisted in the organization and  acquisition of  the companies  included  in Civil Case No. 0033, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth and  in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

Petitioners were impleaded to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish"; PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint.

To be excluded in the Civil Case No. 33, PCGG’s conditions were:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.



ISSUE: Whether this duty to client may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) and other privileged matters.

HELD:YES
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.


However, Summarizing  the exceptions to the rule, information relating  to  the  identity  of  a  client  may  fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.

WHEREFORE petitioners are excluded as parties-defendant in Civ Case No. 0033

Mentioned Attorney-client relationship provisions:

S383 Old civil code
ROC Rule 130 Sec 24(b), RULE 138 S20(a)
Canon 17 CPR
Canon 15 CPE

Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil 569 (1949)
G.R. No. L-961. September 21, 1949
Tuason, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attomey-client relationship.
That respondent‘s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion based on the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto given by her to secure the services of Atty. Francisco although she was not able to pay him legal fees.

Atty Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after, Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her and defendant.

Issue: Was there an attorney client relalionship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?

Held:

YES,  To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.

Disqualified.

Stone vs. Bank of Commerce, 174 US 412 (1899)

FACTS:


The legislature passed an act in 1892 which was in conflict with and more onerous than the Hewitt act of 1866,
a demand was made on the part of the defendant the city of Louisville, based upon the act of 1892, for the payment of a license tax equal to 4 per cent of its gross receipts into the sinking fund of the city. The banks denied their liability to pay any tax other than that provided in the Hewitt act.

Negotiations had been in progress between the city attorney of Louisville and the members of the sinking-fund board, on the one hand, and the counsel for the various banks and trust companies, on the other. The city attorney entered into an agreement, which is now in question as to its validity, as it is beyond his capacity to make.

ISSUE: WON the city attorney exceeded his capacity in making an agreement for his client

HELD:
Yes. An attorney, in his capacity merely as such, has no power to make any agreement for his client before a suit has been commenced, or before he has been retained to commence one. Before the commencement of a suit, or the giving of authority to commence one, there is nothing upon which the authority of an attorney to act for his client can be based.


Guerrero vs. Hernando, 68 SCRA 76 (1975)
Facts:  On the malpractice charge respondent, in an action for partition against complainant, impleaded certain persons in the case as plaintiffs although, allegedly, he was not authorized to do so. Respondent explained, however, he did so at the behest of their uncle who assured the former that said persons were interested in the subject matter of the action and that four of them had executed a special power of attorney designating the uncle as their representative.
On the misrepresentation charge, respondent allegedly indicated in the jurat of a tenancy contract, as the residence certificate of an affiant, the residence certificate corresponding to another person. Respondent explained that the erroneous entry was a purely harmless, clerical or typographical error.

Issue: W/N Atty. Hernando is guilty of misconduct as a Notary Public?

Held: Yes,  The respondent is guilty of misconduct as a notary for his misrepresentation is unquestionably censurable and justifies disciplinary action against the respondent as a member of the bar and as a notary public, violating the mandate in his attorney’s oath to “obey the laws” and “to do no falsehood.
However, the court dismissed the charge of malpractice.

One (1) year barred from acting as notary public.

Uy vs. Gonzales, A.C. No. 5280; March 30, 2004


FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon.

instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him for Falsification of Public Documents.


Gonzales wrote to Uy that he should get a new lawyer, and that the attorney-client relationship terminated when he filed the complaint.



ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:
No.  Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son


PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rilloraza, et. al. vs. Eastern Telecommunications Phil. Inc., 309 SCRA __

 RILORAZA, ET. AL. VS. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 104600,
 July 2, 1999

FACTS: (ETPI) represented by the law firm SAGA filed a complaint for the recovery of revenue shares against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI. SAGA was dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA which took over in the case. After the retainer agreement with ETPI, with attorney’s fees of 15% of the amount collected or liability save, was terminated, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement. RADA filed a motion or the enforcement of attorney’s lien.

ISSUE: Is  RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees they are claiming?

 HELD: Yes. RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the amount must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.

Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing but it was SAGA which was hired. When a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case, but rather, he employs the entire law firm.


Government vs. Wagner, 54 Phil. 132 (1929)

Facts:  the issue is the amount of the refund which the Government should make to the defendants as a condition to rescission of the contract of sale. A total of P2,160.60 as the amount to be paid by the Government as a prerequisite to rescission of the contract. But the court was not seen fit to take up and decide at the outset of the decision. the service that Murphy had was attorney-in-fact and owners of one half interest and when Murphy accepted the service he had in his possession the power of attorney.

Issue: WON Murphy may represent ½ interest of the land in dispute

Held: Murphy had the right to represent his one half undivided interest in the land in dispute and also had the right under universal power of attorney to represent the WAgners. The intention of the parties as in all written instruments should prevail which was to give Murphy the same power to deal with the said property which the Wagners would have if they were present. There were legal means adopted to be able to accomplish the object. Murphy accepted service and by defending absent owners in courts which shows that Murphy was acting for the benefit of the Wagners.



Orbit Transportation vs. WCC, 58 SCRA 78 (1974)
G.R. No. L-38768. July 23, 1974
teehankee


FACTS:

Petitioner’s counsel were charged for suppressing from (their) statement of the case and questions of law involved in the petition the material facts found in the WWC’s decision that the P5,000 claimed to be the compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo by the respondent is the proceeds of the insurance procured by the deceased with premiums paid from the daily income of the late Ramon Crespo' and that the claim was an uncontroverted claim with the apparent intent of misleading the Court as to the merits of the petition.


ISSUE: WON counsel should be reprimanded for suppression of material information

HELD: Yes. Members of the bar owe fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and they must show faithful adherence to the provisions of Rule 7, section 5 that “the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay” with the admonition therein that “for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.”

Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
G.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974
Fernando

FACTS: atty. . Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a pending case, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. respondent Judge deny this, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. he filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure his work, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.

 ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Ledesma may be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.

RULING: NO. Lawyers have an indispensable role as a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, for he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him; and his appointment as Election Registrar is not a sufficient excuse for said withdrawal.


People vs. Daeng, 49 SCRA 816 (1992)
Facts:
Daeng and three other were prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison who accused of killing another inmate hence they were charged for murder. The court appointed Atty. Galvan as their counsel de oficio. They initially pleaded guilty but then the trial judge wrote a letter to the three accused to conduct a “soul searching” seemingly implying that the four accused should change their plea. Ultimately, the four accused changed their plea from “not guilty” to “guilty”. They were convicted and sentenced to death.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction should be set aside
Ruling:
Yes. The four accused were not afforded due process and their conviction is attended by dubious circumstances. A judge “must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, without seeing to it he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.”
the court noticed that Atty. Galvan has been repeatedly assigned as counsel de oficio by the same judge: first, it is unfair, considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases; and, second, the compensation provided for by s32 rule 138 RC might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income., the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would have too little time to spare for his de officio cases, and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.

Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 816 (1992)
 Facts: As a result of SolGen’s withdrawal as counsel in 144 cases, PCGG hired 40 private lawyers, 19 of whom are trial lawyers. As suits and countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had been put to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted or informed by PCGG of the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution and progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all kinds of 'incidents.'" It thus rendered OSG unavoidably incapable of performing its functions and duties as lawyer of the Government.

Issue: Whether SOLGen neglected its duties
 

Held: YES. The Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position.”


Oparel vs. Abaria, 40 SCRA 128 (1971)
Oparel vs Abaria

Facts: Atty. Abaria whose services were retained to assist complainant recover damages from his employer for injuries suffered, acted dishonestly. a settlement was reached, complainant, who is a pauper, having been made to sign a receipt for his claim, out of which attorney's fees deducted, when the truth, according to the complaint, was that respondent did receive the much larger amount. He alleged that it was spent by the employer for plaintiff's operation and medical bills; given to complainant's family during his confinement in the hospital, and then received in cash by way of additional settlement. when investigated, Operal admitted that the administrative charge arose out of a misunderstanding between him and respondent.

Issue:Whether or not respondent can be held liable

Held: No. While no case lies against Atty. Abaria, Where the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers his just demands against an employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to him with all precision and clarity. More than that, no effort should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law. The same zeal should characterize a lawyer’s efforts as when he is defending the rights of property.





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