Regala v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033,
for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA
lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
Petitioners
were impleaded to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG is
not after petitioners but the "bigger fish"; PCGG's willingness to
cut a deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint.
To be excluded in the Civil Case No. 33, PCGG’s
conditions were:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
ISSUE: Whether this duty to
client may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'
client(s) and other privileged matters.
HELD:YES
As a
matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery.
a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
However, Summarizing
the exceptions to the rule, information relating to
the identity of a client
may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such
that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.
WHEREFORE
petitioners are excluded as parties-defendant in Civ Case No. 0033
Mentioned
Attorney-client relationship provisions:
S383
Old civil code
ROC
Rule 130 Sec 24(b), RULE 138 S20(a)
Canon
17 CPR
Canon
15 CPE
Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil 569 (1949)
G.R. No. L-961. September 21, 1949
Tuason, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attomey-client relationship.
Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attomey-client relationship.
That
respondent‘s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion based on the
papers of the case and other information relevant thereto given by her to secure
the services of Atty. Francisco although she was not able to pay him legal
fees.
Atty
Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant and plaintiff did not object to it
until (4) months after, Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case between her
and defendant.
Issue: Was there an attorney client relalionship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
Held:
YES, To constitute professional employment
it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity
with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established.
Disqualified.
Stone vs. Bank of Commerce, 174 US 412 (1899)
FACTS:
The
legislature passed an act in 1892 which was in conflict with and more onerous
than the Hewitt act of 1866,
a
demand was made on the part of the defendant the city of Louisville, based upon
the act of 1892, for the payment of a license tax equal to 4 per cent of its
gross receipts into the sinking fund of the city. The banks denied their
liability to pay any tax other than that provided in the Hewitt act.
Negotiations
had been in progress between the city attorney of Louisville and the members of
the sinking-fund board, on the one hand, and the counsel for the various banks
and trust companies, on the other. The city attorney entered into an agreement,
which is now in question as to its validity, as it is beyond his capacity to
make.
ISSUE: WON the city attorney
exceeded his capacity in making an agreement for his client
HELD:
Yes. An attorney, in his capacity
merely as such, has no power to make any agreement for his client before a suit
has been commenced, or before he has been retained to commence one. Before the
commencement of a suit, or the giving of authority to commence one, there is
nothing upon which the authority of an attorney to act for his client can be
based.
Guerrero vs. Hernando, 68 SCRA 76 (1975)
Facts: On
the malpractice charge respondent, in an action for partition against
complainant, impleaded certain persons in the case as plaintiffs although,
allegedly, he was not authorized to do so. Respondent explained, however, he
did so at the behest of their uncle who assured the former that said persons
were interested in the subject matter of the action and that four of them had
executed a special power of attorney designating the uncle as their
representative.
On
the misrepresentation charge, respondent allegedly indicated in the jurat of a
tenancy contract, as the residence certificate of an affiant, the residence
certificate corresponding to another person. Respondent explained that the
erroneous entry was a purely harmless, clerical or typographical error.
Issue: W/N Atty. Hernando is guilty of
misconduct as a Notary Public?
Held: Yes, The respondent
is guilty of misconduct as a notary for his misrepresentation is unquestionably
censurable and justifies disciplinary action against the respondent as a member
of the bar and as a notary public, violating the mandate in his attorney’s oath
to “obey the laws” and “to do no falsehood.
However, the court dismissed
the charge of malpractice.
One (1) year barred from
acting as notary public.
Uy vs. Gonzales, A.C. No. 5280; March 30, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon.
instead
of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title,
respondent filed a letter-complaint against him for Falsification of Public
Documents.
Gonzales wrote to Uy that he should get a new lawyer, and that the attorney-client relationship terminated when he filed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?
HELD:
No. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Rilloraza, et. al. vs. Eastern Telecommunications Phil.
Inc., 309 SCRA __
RILORAZA,
ET. AL. VS. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 104600,
July 2, 1999
FACTS: (ETPI) represented by the
law firm SAGA filed a complaint for the recovery of revenue shares against
PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI. SAGA was
dissolved and the junior partners formed RADA which took over in the case.
After the retainer agreement with ETPI, with attorney’s fees of 15% of the
amount collected or liability save, was terminated, the parties arrived at an
amicable settlement. RADA filed a motion or the enforcement of attorney’s lien.
ISSUE: Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorney’s
fees they are claiming?
HELD: Yes.
RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but the amount must be determined on a
quantum meruit basis.
Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing
but it was SAGA which was hired. When a client employs the services of a law
firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to
personally handle the case, but rather, he employs the entire law firm.
Government vs. Wagner, 54 Phil. 132 (1929)
Facts:
the issue is the amount of the refund which
the Government should make to the defendants as a condition to rescission of
the contract of sale. A total of P2,160.60 as the amount to be paid by the
Government as a prerequisite to rescission of the contract. But the court was
not seen fit to take up and decide at the outset of the decision. the service
that Murphy had was attorney-in-fact and owners of one half interest and when
Murphy accepted the service he had in his possession the power of attorney.
Issue: WON Murphy
may represent ½ interest of the land in dispute
Held: Murphy had the
right to represent his one half undivided interest in the land in dispute and
also had the right under universal power of attorney to represent the WAgners.
The intention of the parties as in all written instruments should prevail which
was to give Murphy the same power to deal with the said property which the
Wagners would have if they were present. There were legal means adopted to be
able to accomplish the object. Murphy accepted service and by defending absent
owners in courts which shows that Murphy was acting for the benefit of the
Wagners.
Orbit Transportation vs. WCC, 58 SCRA 78
(1974)
G.R. No. L-38768. July 23, 1974
teehankee
FACTS:
Petitioner’s counsel were charged for
suppressing from (their) statement of the case and questions of law involved in
the petition the material facts found in the WWC’s decision that the P5,000
claimed to be the compensation for the death of Ramon Crespo by the respondent
is the proceeds of the insurance procured by the deceased with premiums paid
from the daily income of the late Ramon Crespo' and that the claim was an
uncontroverted claim with the apparent intent of misleading the Court as to the
merits of the petition.
ISSUE: WON counsel should be reprimanded
for suppression of material information
HELD: Yes. Members of the bar owe
fidelity to the courts as well as to their clients and they must show faithful
adherence to the provisions of Rule 7, section 5 that “the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay” with the admonition
therein that “for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected
to disciplinary action.”
Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
G.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974
Fernando
FACTS: atty. . Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar. As he
was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a pending case, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. respondent
Judge deny this, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. he filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure his work, which could prevent him
from handling adequately the defense.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Ledesma may be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
RULING: NO.
Lawyers have an indispensable role as a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
for he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to
him; and his appointment as Election Registrar is not a sufficient excuse for
said withdrawal.
People vs. Daeng, 49 SCRA 816 (1992)
Facts:
Daeng and three other were prisoners
in the New Bilibid Prison who accused of killing another inmate hence they were
charged for murder. The court appointed Atty. Galvan as their counsel de
oficio. They initially pleaded guilty but then the trial judge wrote a letter
to the three accused to conduct a “soul searching” seemingly implying that the
four accused should change their plea. Ultimately, the four accused changed
their plea from “not guilty” to “guilty”. They were convicted and sentenced to
death.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction
should be set aside
Ruling:
Yes. The four accused were not
afforded due process and their conviction is attended by dubious circumstances.
A judge “must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty,
without seeing to it he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
import of an inevitable conviction.”
the court noticed that Atty. Galvan
has been repeatedly assigned as counsel de oficio by the same judge: first, it is unfair, considering the
burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases; and, second, the compensation provided for by
s32 rule 138 RC might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of
income., the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would
have too little time to spare for his de
officio cases, and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in
order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.
Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 816 (1992)
Facts: As a result of
SolGen’s withdrawal as counsel in 144 cases, PCGG hired 40 private lawyers, 19
of whom are trial lawyers. As suits and countersuits stemmed from the original
thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had been put to a tremendous task
and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted or informed by PCGG of
the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution and progress not only
of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all kinds of 'incidents.'" It
thus rendered OSG unavoidably incapable of performing its functions and duties
as lawyer of the Government.
Issue: Whether SOLGen neglected its duties
Issue: Whether SOLGen neglected its duties
Held: YES. The Court clarified that even when "confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position.”
Oparel vs. Abaria, 40 SCRA 128 (1971)
Oparel
vs Abaria
Facts:
Atty. Abaria whose services were retained to assist complainant recover damages
from his employer for injuries suffered, acted dishonestly. a settlement was
reached, complainant, who is a pauper, having been made to sign a receipt for
his claim, out of which attorney's fees deducted, when the truth, according to
the complaint, was that respondent did receive the much larger amount. He
alleged that it was spent by the employer for plaintiff's operation and medical
bills; given to complainant's family during his confinement in the hospital,
and then received in cash by way of additional settlement. when investigated,
Operal admitted that the administrative charge arose out of a misunderstanding
between him and respondent.
Issue:Whether
or not respondent can be held liable
Held: No. While
no case lies against Atty. Abaria, Where the client happens to be poor and
unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers his just demands against an
employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to him with all
precision and clarity. More than that, no effort
should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law. The same zeal should characterize a
lawyer’s efforts as when he is defending the rights of property.
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